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Abstract 
 
The United States military has developed an en route support structure for airlift 
requirements to deploy and sustain combat forces in conflict.  The Air Mobility 
Command (AMC) is interested in determining the cost effectiveness of two distinctly 
different en route structures, in particular, the cost effectiveness of one large facility 
versus supporting combat forces with many smaller facilities.  With the current 
operational tempo, continued analysis must be accomplished to determine if a smaller 
footprint is possible in the deployment and sustainment scenarios of conflicts seen today; 
conflicts more centered on a leaner and faster deployment force.  This research examines 
the requirements of manpower needed to support a network of one large facility and 
compares the data with the same information for a network of many smaller facilities.  
The number of required airfields in a distributed network must be determined to examine 
the manpower cost structure associated with the distributed network; therefore, the 
number of airfields becomes a cornerstone to which the cost analysis is predicated upon.  
The effectiveness of both systems will be measured in aircraft transits per day with the 
cost measured in annual manpower costs.   
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MANPOWER COST ANALYSIS OF A DISTRIBUTED EN ROUTE SUPPORT STRUCTURE  
 
VERSUS A CONSOLIDATED EN ROUTE SUPPORT STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 Logistics plays an intricate role in sustainment of military operations, for without 
logistics, the soldier in the foxhole does not have the ammunition necessary to fire the 
weapon he or she holds.  The complexity involved with delivering the right product, at 
the right time, to the right place can prove quite challenging.  An already complex task 
interwoven into a complex environment can have serious impact on an organization, in 
this case, those men and women fighting on the front lines.  According to Dye in 
Understanding Public Policy, the United States military is postured to fight two 
simultaneous wars in two distinctly different locations around the globe (2008:300).  This 
policy held constant for many years, but as the 20th Century ended, a new policy was 
beginning to form.  This policy, referred to as the “one-four-two-one” construct, was 
focused on defending the homeland first, effectively operate in four other strategic areas, 
fight in two nearly simultaneous combat operations, and win decisively in one of the two 
combat operations at the direction of the President (QDR, 2001).  After the terrorist 
attacks of 2001, this strategy began to morph to a strategy similar to the one-four-two-one 
construct with a renewed emphasis on victory in the conflicts currently on-going, 
sustainment within these states, and a priority on the nuclear mission.  The Quadrennial 
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Defense Review completed and published in 2010 states the defense strategies of today 
“…must balance resources and risk among four priority objectives” (2010).  These 
objectives are “prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat 
adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the 
All-Volunteer force (QDR, 2010).  These organizational factors, coupled with 
humanitarian efforts such as the tsunami relief in southeast Asia in 2004, piracy threats 
on the ocean, and now earthquake relief efforts in Haiti, are causing the military logistical 
problems that span a much broader area than just fighting on two battlefronts.  This 
complex process in a highly complex environment lends itself to further analysis on ways 
to provide the same, if not better, sustainment while minimizing as much of the costs as 
possible. 
From the birth of the United States Air Force in 1947 up until the end of the Cold 
War with the Soviet Union, the United States has relied on a “first-strike” deterrence 
when decisions were to be made on global support base positions (Lang, 2009:2).  This 
thought process was conceived as a deterrent to other countries, as any first 
unconventional attack would be countered by a much stronger and ever-lasting 
counterattack (Hitch, 1960).  With a strong presence in areas around the globe, the 
military has been afforded the opportunity to build an infrastructure to deter threats from 
others, serve as a defense force for allies, and support en route basing decisions for 
logistical purposes.   
Roughly twenty years ago, the United States was faced with a significant 
drawdown after the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended.  With this drawdown, the en 
route support system (ERS) has only 13 bases for use compared to the 45 bases seen in 
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the early 1990s.  Many military locations were closed and the associated personnel were 
transferred to bases in the continental United States, and as a result the bases that remain 
are now vitally important to the structure as the only means to move cargo and 
passengers into and out of war zones (GAO-01-566, 2001:9). 
Figure 1 below from Sere’s thesis, provides a look at the bases in Europe and Asia 
that serve as en route locations used today.  These bases are situated to provide 
maintenance capabilities, crew staging, and refueling locations (Sere, 2005:1). 
 
 
Figure 1:  Current En Route Bases 
  
Ramstein Air Base, Germany, had 470 aircraft transits in January of 2009.  Aside 
from the primary bases considered in the area of operation (Middle East), the only base 
with more transits in the same month was Little Rock AFB, AR.  Aircraft that depart 
from the United States, especially on the east coast, will often transit through Ramstein 
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AB due to its size, airlift mission, and presence.  Figure 2 below is representative of a 
consolidated en route support system which would incorporate a large military presence 
to include the many support functions that would be necessary to support a base of this 
size.  Inherent to a consolidated base like that of Ramstein AB, numerous support 
functions are required in order to sustain the primary missions.  This would, in turn, result 
in large amounts of people located in one particular area.  The capital expenditure up 
front is astronomical for a base of this size.   
 
 
Figure 2:  Consolidated Base at Ramstein AB 
 
To counter this expenditure, the use of a distributed en route support structure that 
would utilize an already in place infrastructure may prove just as beneficial but at a much 
lower cost.  This concept of a distributed network would result in a pre-defined number 
of bases used in a certain area, geographically separated but at no significant change in 
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anticipated fuel burn.  An example of a distributed en route support system is depicted by 
Figure 3 below.   
The Air Mobility Command (AMC) and the United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) are interested in analyzing the en route structure and 
continue to look for ways to improve the system and provide more flexibility and 
versatility at the same time.  And at a time when the United States is spread thin between 
two wars and relief efforts around the world, this en route support structure must continue 
to be analyzed to adapt and change with current global conditions.   
 
 
Figure 3:  Example of a Distributed Network of Bases in Europe 
 
Problem Statement 
With the current force structure, coupled with the operational tempo that exists 
and the necessary logistical requirement to support forces, what is the most cost-effective 
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means in terms of en route support systems to support the war fighter?  Minimizing the 
cost is vitally important, but more important than that is the requirement to maintain a 
defined throughput capability to ensure the necessary items reach the foxhole from an 
initial location, often thousands of miles away.  Therefore, the focus of this research is to 
examine the manpower cost associated with a distributed en route support system and 
compare it to a consolidated system through a cost analysis.   For the purpose of this 
research, throughput capability is defined as the number of aircraft transits per day. 
Research Question 
 For a more comprehensive examination of the research, several questions must be 
answered.  The following questions are answered in order to provide a more thorough 
analysis: 
• For a consolidated en route system comparison, what current base Unit Manning 
Document most closely resembles a specific airlift only mission? 
• What operations will be supported by the distributed bases? 
• Based on the operations supported, what will be the maximum aircraft on ground 
(MOG)? 
• What Unit Type Code(s) would suffice for the distributed en route support system 
cost comparison? 
 The rest of this document is organized as follows.  Chapter II presents the 
necessary and pertinent literature to this en route cost analysis.  Chapter III explains the 
methodology used to approach this analysis.  Chapter IV presents the results of the cost 
analysis through the use of the methodology.  Finally, Chapter V provides conclusions 
and recommendations of the study. 
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
 This chapter provides a review of the pertinent literature of en route structures and 
the strategy associated with them.  A history of en route structures dating back roughly 20 
year begins the chapter, followed by an overview of the literature that contributes to the 
analysis of throughput capability and the actual cost analysis of the required manpower.  
The chapter concludes with recent academic work in the realm of en route support 
structures. 
The Current En Route Structure History 
 There has been much discussion on the ERS, in particular since the end of the 
Cold War when the United States drew down forces throughout Europe with base 
closures and realignments.  The drawdown significantly reduced the flexibility that the 45 
original ERS bases provided.  Of these 45 bases, the drawdown closed the majority and 
only 13 ERS bases now remain.  The Department of Defense selected these bases 
“according to their proximity to anticipated war zones, the host nation’s willingness to 
allow the use of its bases, and other factors such as climate” (GAO-01-566, 2001:5).  
They were also planned according to the maximum efficient range of the C-17 aircraft 
without a refuel; a 3,500 nautical mile distance from the United States and the anticipated 
war zones (GAO-01-566, 2001:5).  “The lens” concept incorporates the 3,500 nautical 
mile optimal range of a C-17 with 45 short tons of cargo (McVickar, 2002:14).  
According to a Graduate Research Paper authored by Jeanette Voigt, the lens is created 
by drawing two arcs; one from a coast in the United States 3,500 nautical miles away and 
the other arc originating from a point in a previously identified area of operation 
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(2005:6).  The point of intersection then becomes the optimal location for en route 
facilities.  In the European theater (which serves current operations in the Middle East 
and Southwest Asia) all six en route bases fall within this lens.  The Pacific theater 
cannot adopt this strategy due to the geographical location of the United States in relation 
to Asia.  Therefore two routes have been determined for en route airfields into and out of 
this theater:  The Northern Pacific route through Alaska and the Middle Pacific route 
through Hawaii (Voigt, 2005:7).  According to the GAO report, these bases are typically 
staffed for peacetime operations, and would normally require additional personnel and 
equipment to support contingency operations (2001:6); an important part of this analysis.  
 Desert Storm brought visibility to the fact that with the airfields that were 
currently in use, the system relied on a few key airfields, and thus the system was 
susceptible to delays attributed to weather and other unforeseen circumstances 
(McVickar, 2002:21).  Concern mounted for the capability of the ERS as the demand 
requirements at these bases began to increase.  Thus, the Air Mobility Command dubbed 
1997 as the “Year of the En Route System” as an attempt to gain visibility and ultimately 
funding for the shortfalls in capability (GAO-01-566, 2001:2).  With the new emphasis 
placed on the ERS, committees were formed in both the European Area of Responsibility 
(AOR) and the Pacific Area of Responsibility.  By teaming with the United States 
Transportation Command, both AORs established their own committees, whereby the 
partnerships evolved into the European En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee 
(EERISC) and the Pacific En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee (PERISC) in 1998 
and 1999, respectively.  These committees serve mainly as forums to “research, identify, 
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prioritize, and act on current and future en route infrastructure-related initiatives” 
(McVickar, 2002:20).  
 The EERISC developed a “six-lose-one” strategy in support of operations in 
Europe and Southwest Asia “in which all airlift flow would transit through any five of the 
six main European en route airfields” (McVickar, 2002:11).  PERISC developed its own 
airlift strategy on what the EERISC had identified, and came up with two possible en 
route strategies to support efforts in Asia:  one route through Hawaii and another 
transiting through Elmendorf, AK (McVickar, 2002:19).  McVickar further states that 
along with identifying specific strategic routes into each AOR, the committees also 
identified areas within the infrastructure that required significant funding for 
improvements (2002:13). 
 With the ever-changing global environment, these en route strategies must be 
continually reviewed, modified, and updated on a recurring basis.  According to a recent 
AMC White Paper discussing the Global En Route Strategy, “…we recommend that 
every two years, the command undertake a comprehensive review of the en route 
strategy.” (White Paper).  The author(s) cite many reasons for a newly defined global en 
route strategy, to include, but not limited to the following: 
• “Significant manpower reductions as a result of the Program Budget Decision 
720; 
• The emphasis now placed on the Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century; 
mainly as a result of the reduction in manpower, no decrease in work and the 
desire to be more efficient.  In economical terms, a reduction in the supply but an 
increase in demand; 
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• The establishment of Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the competing 
mobility requirements associated with its establishment; 
• The evolving nature of the battlespace that will likely be much more demanding 
of air mobility for deployment, supply, and redeployment; 
• Advent of Just-In-Time Logistics concepts; 
• The change in composition of the airlift fleet since the MRS-05 study” (White 
Paper) 
According to the GAO-01-566 report, the Mobility Requirement Study 2005 
(MRS-05) was released in 2001 as “an extensive update of DOD’s 1992 and 1995 
analyses of air, sea, and land transportation requirements for the United States to 
mobilize for war” (2001:2).  The aim of this study was to estimate “the mobility assets 
and supporting infrastructure needed to deploy for the two war scenario and compared 
them to current capabilities and those planned for 2005” (GAO-01-566, 2001:6).  This 
study reflected a shortfall in throughput capability of the 13 current en route airfields in 
the event of “overlapping theater wars”.  The exact requirements and the capacities 
associated with the ERS are classified and therefore not presented (GAO-01-566, 
2001:6).  For the MRS-05 study, a modeling approach was used, but the assumptions 
made are cause for uncertainty by the GAO.  According to the GAO article, the net 
effects of the study are unknown because some of the assumptions may have 
underestimated the shortfall.  The article mentions the assumption that some of these old 
and deteriorated ERS airfields will operate without breaking down, though the GAO did 
believe these underestimations would at least be partially offset by incorporating the “six-
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lose-one strategy” (2001:7).  There is also cause for concern with the possibility of an 
overestimation with the model itself (2001:7).   
The Department of Defense used a model named the Airlift Flow Model, whereby 
it simulates complex systems such as the ERS, and it “…does not necessarily identify the 
best or optimal solution to mobilization requirements” (GAO-01-566, 2001:7).  
According to the GAO report, the model continues to search for a solution through a 
simulation of cargo movements, but the solution generated may not be the optimal one 
(2001:7).  Optimization models do exist, but the Department of Defense expresses 
reservation in the solutions that are provided, citing “that optimization models can come 
to unrealistic conclusions because they cannot simulate random events and may use 
information (such as longer-range plans for an entire mobilization) that may not be 
available to commanders early in the mobilization” (GAO-01-566, 2001:9).  Regardless 
of the conclusions found with this study, the time in which it was completed was before 
significant events occurred in the global environment and therefore a re-examination of 
the overall ERS is a must.  In a 2004 testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee, then USTRANSCOM Commander General John Handy states that the 
European and Pacific en route projects have been implemented primarily due to the 
MRS-05 study and the established requirements.  But he further states that in order to 
support on-going contingencies in the Middle East, additional infrastructure is required 
and is being studied by both the EERISC and the PERISC, moreover “…today’s current 
operations, combined with existing studies, further demonstrate the need for expanded 
hazardous cargo capabilities at en route and theater airfields around the globe.  To this 
end, USTRANSCOM is working with combatant commanders, Joint Staff, and DLA 
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(Defense Logistics Agency) to implement a truly global en route infrastructure system” 
(Handy, 2004). 
Necessary Literature for Analysis 
 Significant use of military charts, documents, and pamphlets were used in order to 
better understand and complete the analysis.  This literature is discussed in the following 
sub-headings as a better means for readability.   
Throughput Capability 
 Regardless of the strategy used to determine the ERS, the requirement of most 
importance is the ability of the ERS to sustain the required throughput necessary to the 
AOR.  For the purpose of this analysis, an examination of the cost associated with a 
consolidated ERS with that of a distributed ERS would require that the comparison be 
made with a calculated number of bases in the distributed system that would equal the 
throughput capability of the consolidated ERS.  This analysis took a formula already 
defined and in existence from Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403 Air Mobility Planning 
Factors published in 2003 and modified it slightly for use.  The pamphlet serves a vital 
role in the analysis of en route strategies in general, both for peacetime as well as in 
wartime operations by providing “…broad air mobility factors…” (AFPAM 10-1403, 
2003:1).  Further stated, “It is designed to help service, joint, and combined planners 
make gross estimates about mobility requirements in the early stages of the planning 
process” (2003:1).    The formula below was the cornerstone in defining the distributed 
throughput capability: 
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A further description of each of the variables included in the formula is discussed 
in the following chapter, but for purposes of the literature review itself it is important to 
note that the maximum (aircraft) on ground (MOG) factor used coincide with the lower 
number associated with the working, the parking, and the fuel MOG (AFPAM 10-1403, 
2003:5).  As defined by the Air Force Pamphlet, MOG is literally the maximum number 
of aircraft which can be accommodated on the airfield (usually the parking MOG) 
(2003:25).  The following list defines the aforementioned MOG definitions in AFPAM 
10-1403: 
• Working MOG:  Maximum number of aircraft which can be simultaneously 
“worked” by maintenance, aerial port personnel, and others that potentially could 
be associated with the airlift mission. 
• Parking MOG:  Used synonymously with the general definition of MOG.  
• Fuel MOG:  Maximum number of aircraft which can be simultaneously refueled 
(2003:25). 
For most ERS analyses, the throughput capability is a necessary determination to 
identify and locate any airfield which may pose a potential limiting factor (LIMFAC) in 
the planned ERS (AFPAM 10-1403:8).  The pamphlet does make mention that for initial 
planning purposes, the assumption that all en route locations have higher throughput 
capability than that of the onload and offload locations (2003:8).  While this initial 
assumption easily holds in the context of a consolidated ERS, for the distributed network 
of facilities, the assumption must be relaxed for a more accurate calculation of the likely 
number of bases required.  For a different number of bases required, a more accurate 
depiction of the manpower costs associated with that system are required for analysis.  
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While AFPAM 10-1403 was the cornerstone for the formulation of the analysis, the 
Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) Planners Guide provided an initial MOG value for 
use in the analysis. 
The TACC Planners Guide provides general and basic information related to a 
particular airport such as runway lengths, aircraft instrument approach procedures, and 
airfield operating hours.  It also includes the MOG data used for the analysis, and in 
particular the formula derived from AFPAM 10-1403.  This data is presented below in 
Figure 4.  This figure provides an initial estimation of the MOG required for use in the 
formula, and since the contingency MOG is the same as the working MOG in this 
instance, no delineation is required for the purpose of this particular analytical example.  
The TACC Planners Guide is also extremely useful for the “operating time” variable, and 
per this guide, 22 hours is used due to the quiet hours mandate from 2200-0001 local 
time.  This figure is presented in the next chapter. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Excerpt from TACC Planners Guide for Ramstein AB, Germany 
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Manpower Cost Analysis  
For the purpose of this study, the manpower cost associated with the two ERS 
systems is of importance and makes the analysis possible.  Pay charts are necessary in 
order to determine the annual pay per rank, to include both military service members as 
well as DOD civilians.  For the military, these are easily obtained but some of the civilian 
pay structures were more difficult to access.  Those charts used are discussed further in 
the next chapter.  AFI 65-503 US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors provides “…cost 
and planning factors that Air Force activities use to estimate resource requirements and 
costs associated with Air Force force structures, missions, and activities” (1994:1).  The 
instruction actually caveats its own use by stating that the factors used “…are for general 
estimates” and should be combined or replaced with more specific or actual cost data 
when available (1994:1).  For this analysis more specific data was used, mainly with the 
aforementioned annual pay per year per person charts for military service members and 
DOD civilians, though a supplemental tool was included within the analysis used for 
estimation purposes when specific manpower requirements are not known.  The table 
used, from which the supplemental tool was formulated, is located in Appendix B. 
There were a few documents necessary for review that are used to facilitate 
planning for mobility requirements.  One particular document, the Air Force Contingency 
Response Group Operational Concept, was used in the initial analysis of what a 
distributed base might look like in terms of personnel required for a specific mobility 
mission.  With the current deployment structure of the Air Force, specifically the Air 
Expeditionary Force concept, the document elaborates on the requirements “…to rapidly 
respond to contingencies as well as to secure and protect airfields, rapidly assess and 
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open airbases, and perform initial airfield/airbase operations to ensure a smooth transition 
to subsequent operations” (Lee, 2004:1).  This document was drafted as a means by 
which all Air Force Contingency Response Groups (CRG) will be standardized for easier 
employment where required to support the Joint Force Commander (2004:1).  Lee 
delineated between different tiers of operation and defines them as “…five distinct 
modules that group combat, command and control, and expeditionary combat support 
together…” (2004:3).  These five modules are listed below: 
• “Open the Airbase” 
• “Command and Control” 
• “Establish the Airbase” 
• “Generate the Mission” 
• “Operate the Airbase” (2004:3) 
Though this document serves a role more directly related to contingency 
operations and the initial employment of mobility forces, it does serve as another means 
by which to estimate the requirements for a distributed support system.  Lee includes an 
agreed upon standardized package for use that includes the maintenance requirements 
and aerial port operations, which coupled with the Air Mobility Command Playbook 
identifies potentially useful data surrounding the question of what a distributed base 
would require in terms of manpower.  This package became integral to the inclusion of 
certain UTCs for use in the study, and can be considered the backbone from which the 
decisions were made for manpower requirements at the distributed bases. 
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Recent Academic Work 
 With the Global War on Terror, continued throughput analysis is required 
especially as we see continued instability throughout the world.  The likelihood now 
exists that the military will be responsible for not only the major theaters of war, but also 
the smaller contingencies that develop.  On top of that, the supply of aid in the wake of 
natural disasters can be expected.  For these reasons, there has been recent research to 
help develop tools and thought processes to aid decision makers in the en route support 
system.  Although the current en route support structure does allow a great amount of 
flexibility within the continents of Europe and Asia, it does not allow for efficient 
transportation in other parts of the world. 
 Sere developed a goal programming based scoring technique to evaluate 25 
potential enroute airfields in 8 geographical locations around the world (2005:75).  These 
25 potential airfields were identified by USTRANSCOM.  Sere states that “the purpose 
of the goal program based methodology is to find the potential en route airfields which 
maximize the sum of the weighted percent deviations based on each goal and its 
associated weight” (2005:16).  The goals associated with his analysis are the max critical 
leg of the route, the parking MOG at a particular airfield, the fuel capacity at the 
particular airfield, diplomatic relations with the country where the airfield is located, the 
proximity to a coastal seaport, and airfields within 2,250 miles of the en route airfield 
(Sere, 2005:16).  The program identified three airfields within each of the eight 
geographical locations, which Sere stated can now be further evaluated in future research.  
Specifically, an evaluation of the throughput capability of airfields would be necessary to 
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determine if these previously identified potential airfields could transit the required short 
ton capability to support the end customer. 
 Sere’s research set an important foundation for Voigt’s studies that centered more 
on the idea of analyzing throughput capability.  Her research developed the Virtual 
Throughput Model (VTM) which “estimates the weight of cargo moved through an en 
route location daily” (Voigt, 2005:14).  In Voigt’s model, she further evaluated the 
airfields, as well as the actual geographic location for a more accurate estimation of an 
aircraft’s cargo capacity at that particular location.  Voigt posits that “runway length, air 
temperature, and pressure altitude all affect an aircraft’s gross takeoff weight and 
therefore the amount of cargo it can carry” (Voigt, 2005:15).  These factors can also 
combine complicating matters further.  The distance traveled will dictate fuel burn, and 
will affect the amount of weight capable of airlift.  But Voigt also incorporated the fact 
that a shorter distance traveled, equated to a lower altitude of flight which in turn burns 
more fuel.   
 Voigt’s model evaluated the throughput from each pairing of the 14 potential en 
routes and eight destinations, “…creating a total of 112 en route/destinations pairs” 
(Voigt, 2005:22).  She also ran her model based on three separate aircraft fleet mixes.  
Voigt found that each of the 14 potential airfields was a “top three provider” of 
throughput capability for a minimum of one destination (Voigt, 2005:48).  With her 
analysis of the actual infrastructure in existence at the time of her research, Voigt states 
that because of military budget constraints, it would now be “efficient use of 
resources…” to invest in infrastructure improvements at all 14 locations (Voigt, 
2005:48).  Her final conclusion is that there are three en route airfields that are best to 
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include as en route locations, based on cargo throughput capability (Voigt, 2005:48).  
Voigt recognized the importance of throughput capability, and therefore provided a 
means to further augment Sere’s program.   
Summary 
 There has been limited research in the realm of en route strategy, but what has 
been done has provided a strong foundation for the subject.  Due to the military-specific 
nature of the subject, this may continue.  However, AMC and USTRANSCOM continue 
to show interest in the research and have formed a partnership with the Air Force Institute 
of Technology that will continue to extend the necessary research and potentially provide 
answers to the important decisions regarding en route strategy.  As for the research that 
has been done, a void exists in the costs associated with increasing the number of en 
routes compared to en routes already in place.     
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III. Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the procedures used to analyze the manpower cost structure 
of a consolidated versus a distributed en route support system.  Specifically, AMC/A9AA 
wanted to examine the possibility of replacing a large consolidated base with all of the 
supporting manpower allotments with a smaller network of bases that equaled the 
necessary throughput, but utilizing already inherent manpower specific to an existing 
airport (air traffic control, weather, etc.); thereby decreasing the required personnel to 
only those individuals necessary for a specific mission. In the case of this research, a 
refuel only mission is considered.  Because of thorough analysis of the history of the en 
route support system strategy, as well as analysis of the current system, the procedures 
used to model the distributed system were possible.  While the literature reviewed and 
previous studies have contributed to a broad understanding of the topic, there were a 
couple key offices within AMC that were integral to the completion of the study; they 
were the experts in the field and are mentioned throughout the methodology.  To begin, 
the procedures used to develop the consolidated manpower analysis are discussed, 
followed by the analysis used to develop the distributed manpower cost analysis.  Finally, 
a description of how throughput capability was incorporated into this study in order to 
better estimate the personnel associated with a distributed system, are discussed.  This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the assumptions and limitations used in this study. 
Consolidated Manpower Analysis 
 Through discussions with Mr. Johnson and the AMC/A9AA office, the decision 
was made to forego the typical cost analysis regulation, AFI 65-503, as the data already 
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exists to do a more thorough calculation of the manpower costs.  As cited in Chapter II, 
AFI 65-503 states that the calculations used are merely estimates as a means for initial 
planning factors, and should more specific data exist, the analysis should be conducted 
with the more specific and thorough data (1994:1).  The average cost calculation 
described in AFI 65-503 was included in the workbook model for further use in 
estimation should the inability to use actual data exist.  A comparison was also done with 
the final numbers generated for both, and the comparison is discussed further in Chapter 
IV.   
The AMC/A9AA office was heavily involved with the initial analysis phase of 
this research; a necessity since the question originated from the office, but also due to the 
expertise required in exactly how best to evaluate the en route system in this manner.  
While the model developed and the concept is not specific to a particular base or groups 
of bases, for a conceptual understanding, an example was provided in order to better 
describe the process.  Ramstein AB, depicted and defined as one of the 13 current en 
route support bases, plays a vital role in the en route system.  Ramstein AB is capable of 
providing the most throughput capability in the European theater, and therefore the base 
served as a focal point for the study.  Ramstein AB, though a key base for en route 
studies, has a multitude of other functions associated with the base and therefore posed 
somewhat of a limitation on the manpower analysis.  The analysis was completed to 
model only the en route capability mission, and not the other missions that may be 
included at a base.  For this reason, the Unit Manning Document (UMD) for Ramstein 
AB would not suffice for the comparison since there would be no delineation between 
airlift only personnel and non-airlift personnel.  The support personnel, for example 
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finance, medical, and law, would all have positions staffed for the base in its entirety and 
therefore would prove problematic in the analysis.  The AMC/A1MR office, in particular 
Dennis Miller, proved vital in providing information and expertise in the manpower 
realm.  It was at this office where the UMD was obtained for use in the study, and it was 
this individual who provided a description of potential bases to use for the study, 
particularly the bases that currently have one mission, an airlift only mission. 
 According to Miller, Dover AFB, DE was the best base to model for an airlift 
only mission as the manpower requirements were of better use as compared to Ramstein 
AB; Charleston AFB, South Carolina; Travis AFB, California; and McGuire AFB, NJ.  
For that reason, the UMD for Dover AFB was used as the basis of the manpower cost 
comparison analysis of the consolidated en route support system.  The UMD was reduced 
to only reflect the rank structure and the number of personnel authorized by the UMD for 
each rank.  The UMD can be found in Appendix C.  For clarification purposes, the UMD 
lists 27 allocations of a rank to be determined.  These personnel slots were not included 
in the analysis, as there was no way to determine with any certainty the associated rank of 
these individuals.  After determining the proper UMD to use for cost analysis purposes, 
the next step in the methodology was to calculate the annual pay rate for the grades listed 
in the UMD.  The following formula was used to calculate the total annual pay associated 
with the study and is used throughout the study: 
 
                                          (1) 
where 
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    AP = calculated annual mean pay per rank n 
    X = the number of allotted slots per rank n 
    n = pay grade (to include military and civilian) 
 Military Pay Rate 
 The military pay scale used for this study was the Basic Pay Rate effective 1 
January 2010.  This scale can be found in Appendix D of this text.  To take into account 
the time in service aspect of a military member’s pay, the mean pay rate was calculated 
from the first day of service up to 22 years time in service.  Year 22 was chosen as the 
cutoff as a rough estimate of the typical time an O-6 would have in the service; this 
assumption is further discussed at the conclusion of this chapter.  After this calculation 
was made, the number was simply included in the workbook model and multiplied by the 
number of personnel at a particular grade in the UMD used for the study.  The total 
number of personnel was tallied and the associated annual manpower cost was included, 
but this number was but a part of the overall comparison.  The annual base pay was the 
only individual pay that was accounted for in this study as a way to capture the only 
assured income received by an individual.  Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) was not 
included due to the variability in the number itself:  mainly the multiple locations 
conceivable, but also since the pay rate changes based on the number of dependents.  
There could also exist incentive pay depending on the location of the base.  Assuming 
these en route bases would be located outside the country, family separation pay would 
have to be considered, as well as hostile fire pay, combat pay, etc.  Due to the complexity 
and changing nature of the possibilities included with all other allotted payments, base 
pay was chosen as the only pay included in the study.  The workbook then calculated the 
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total number of personnel required in the system, as well as the total cost associated with 
the military service members.  The UMD also had a large representation of civil servants 
included, and those calculations ensued.   
 General Schedule Pay Rates 
 Similar to the accessibility of the published military pay rates, the General 
Schedule (GS) pay scales are easy to obtain.  Appendix E depicts the pay scale used.  
Similar to the way the annual pay rate was calculated for the military rank structure, the 
mean annual pay rate was formulated.  The GS pay system, while not determined by 
years of service, has a similar structure in that pay increases within each rank.  The pay 
increases within a rank are considered steps within the rank with equal increase amounts 
from GS-3 through GS-15.  Due to the varying amounts of pay within the grades, the 
mean monthly pay was calculated for each GS rank and then multiplied by 12 months for 
the expected annual pay per rank.  This number was then used to calculate the pay 
associated with each GS rank in the Dover AFB UMD.  The annual pay was the only 
individual pay that was accounted for in this study due to the same reason as the military 
pay system with potential other allotted amounts of pay.  After the individual ranks and 
the associated costs were tabulated, a simple calculation was included in the workbook to 
identify the total number of personnel required.  The workbook also calculated the total 
manpower cost for the General Schedule employees to include in the final calculation in 
the workbook.  Before the final calculation could be made, there were other pay scales 
requiring analysis. 
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Wage Grade Pay Rates 
 The Wage Grade (WG) pay rates were not as easy to obtain as the previous two 
pay scales, but the pay scale that was desired for use was found.  The WG system 
provides the hourly rates associated with certain occupations throughout a base.  It was 
found that the hourly rate varied from region to region as a means by which to account 
for the cost of living.  For the purpose of this study, the pay scale associated with the 
Dover AFB, DE area was used.  The data used for the analysis can be found in Appendix 
F but unfortunately the data was from 2009, as the 2010 pay structure has not yet been 
finalized.  The pay structure resembles that of the GS pay system in that within each 
grade, there are multiple rates an individual can be paid.  With the raw data as an hourly 
rate, the mean hourly rate calculated for each grade was taken and then multiplied by ten 
representing the hours of work per day multiplied by five for the number of work days in 
a week multiplied by 52 for the number of weeks in a year to obtain the mean annual pay 
per rank.  This calculation was completed for the WG grades and then used to calculate 
the cost for that rank multiplied by the number of individuals at that rank based on the 
Dover AFB UMD.  As before, after the individual ranks were calculated, the total 
number of personnel and the total cost associated with the WG employees was tabulated.  
 Other Pay Rates 
 As evidenced by the UMD in Appendix C, there are other civilian ranks to be 
considered in the analysis.  In particular, the ranks preceded by a “Y”.  These ranks are a 
part of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and include the Standard Career 
Group, the Scientific and Engineering Career Group, Medical Career Group, and the 
Investigative and Protective Services.  Of note, this pay system has since been repealed 
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under 5 U.S.C. Section 9902 and while the positions are still recognized for pay purposes, 
by 2012 this system will be completely reverted back to the GS pay system “and cease to 
be effective” (2009).  But since these positions are still incorporated within the UMD 
used for this study, the positions and the pay associated with them are still utilized in the 
analysis. This pay system is slightly different from the others, and hence the calculation 
was not the same.  Per the NSPS Worldwide Pay Table, the base salary per year provided 
was a band with a minimum number and a maximum number.  As each salary position 
varied with the minimum and maximum, the decision was made to take the mean of the 
two numbers with the result being the mean annual pay per salary position.  With this 
calculation completed, the number was then implemented into the workbook and 
multiplied by the number of allotted positions for the position as defined by the Dover 
UMD, and then the total number of NSPS paid employees was calculated along with the 
total cost of these individuals. 
The final calculation for the consolidated cost analysis was to sum up the total 
personnel required for the base and was merely the sum of the individual group sums.  
Likewise, the total manpower cost was calculated by simply taking the sum of the total 
annual pay calculations made for each pay system.   
Distributed Manpower Analysis 
 The consolidated analysis was much easier to set up than that of the distributed 
analysis, mainly due to the fact that the consolidated base is already in existence and a 
UMD was readily available for use.  For the distributed manpower analysis, a more 
thorough examination was required and the AMC/A9AA office was once again very 
helpful in providing the necessary data to make the research possible.  The initial phase 
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of this part of the research focused on the Air Mobility Command Playbook and the Air 
Force Contingency Response Group Operational Concept.  Both support the analysis by 
providing background into the decisions required.  Ultimately a Unit Type Code (UTC) 
was selected for the purpose of this en route analysis by the experts at the AMC/A9AA 
office. 
 Initial Phase 
 Multiple guides are in use for multiple scenarios in the mobility world, and for 
that reason, the analysis had to be designed around a specific problem in en route 
strategy.  Initial estimates were based on generic packages not specifically tailored to any 
particular UTC.  The first analysis considered a MOG 1 – 1 Shift operation depicted in 
Figure 5 on the following page.  It provides the data associated with this analysis and 
comes from the AMC Playbook.  This data provides the total number of passengers and 
cargo required to sustain aircraft, one at a time during a 12 hour work day.  It further 
defines the personnel and cargo requirements by identifying organizations within a 
normal Wing construct (maintenance, aerial port, medical, etc.) and the required cargo 
necessary to perform their specific duties.  This Playbook identified these same 
requirements for a multitude of other MOGs including shift operations, with the most 
demanding being a MOG 6 – 2 Shift operation that requires over 800 personnel (to 
include Security Forces).  The breakdown in the Playbook also includes the airlift 
requirements to deliver both the passengers and the cargo for each scenario, which 
enhances the planning capabilities for the strategy.  The variability in options allows for a 
multitude of possible analyses, especially a contingency type environment which is 
discussed later in this analysis as a possible research topic in the future. 
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Figure 5:  AMC Playbook Excerpt of MOG 1 - 1 Shift Operation 
  
In Chapter II, the Air Force Contingency Response Group Operational Concept 
was mentioned as the backbone for the selection of UTCs to include in the analysis.  
Figure 6 on the following page depicts a snapshot of a portion of Lee’s contingency 
response group.  This response group served as a baseline for the distributed analysis and 
the highlighted portions of the data include what could serve as a representation of the 
manpower required at a distributed base; note that the researcher is responsible for the 
highlights. 
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Figure 6:  Portion of Lee's CRG Requirements 
 
The highlighted areas of the document are what the researcher deemed possible 
minimum requirements at a distributed base.  This later was tailored farther by the 
AMC/A9AA office to reflect the requirements of an en route refuel base only.  The 
document prepared by Lee is extremely useful in that it allows a decision maker the 
ability to tailor a package as he or she deems necessary.  With quick visual 
representation, the personnel required are defined, described, and numbered, and it also 
includes the actual UTC used to define these personnel.  Again, the usefulness of Lee’s 
document, which was approved by General John P. Jumper, the Chief of Staff at the time, 
provides the backbone for the distributed manpower analysis of this research and must be 
considered and reviewed for any future manpower analyses for the en route support 
system.  
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With the basis for the manpower requirements analyzed and understood, a more 
defined package was tailored to meet the specifications set forth by the AMC/A9AA 
office.  Through that office, specific UTCs were selected and placed with a certain 
aircraft transits per day requirement as defined by the researcher.  There were five UTCs 
selected for further examination:  7E1AF, 7E1AE, HFHC1, HFHC2, and 7E1AN:   
• 7E1AF:  designed to “…manage, monitor, and control aircraft ground ops for 
working MOG of one.  UTC is capable of 24-hour coverage but limited to 12 hour 
ops.”  It includes a total of four personnel:  one 7-level in-flight refuel craftsman, 
one 7-level aircraft loadmaster craftsman, one 5-level aircraft loadmaster 
journeyman, and one 5-level RF transmission systems journeyman. 
• 7E1AE:  designed to “manage, monitor, and control aircraft ground operations for 
working MOG of 12 or less, capable of sustained 24-hour-a-day command and 
control support operations during deployment and redeployment.”  It includes a 
total of 11 personnel; three officers and eight enlisted.  Three general mobility 
airlift pilots with two Captains and one Major, one 7-level in-flight refuel 
craftsman, one 7-level aircraft loadmaster craftsman, one 5-level aircraft 
loadmaster journeyman, two 7-level command post craftsman, one 5-level 
command post journeyman, one 5-level airfield management journeyman, and 
one 5-level personnel journeyman. 
• HFHC1:   Considered an independent UTC that “…provides quick turn 
maintenance for maximum on ground (MOG) of one to two C-5/C-17 aircraft in a 
12-hour day 247 man-hours per month basis”.  This UTC provides the minimum 
number of maintenance personnel with the capability of ground handling and 
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servicing, towing, and performing a tire change to support an established 
command and control element.  The maintenance team has the red-x downgrade 
authority along with an all-systems red-x sign off capability and in-process 
inspection qualification.  The team has a total of six members; two 7-level 
aerospace maintenance craftsmen, three 5-level aerospace maintenance 
journeymen, and one 9-level aerospace maintenance superintendent.  Should the 
desire exist to increase the operation from 12 hours to a 24 hour operation, this 
UTC can be augmented by the HFHC2 UTC. 
• HFHC2:  Considered a dependent UTC that “…provides quick turn maintenance 
for maximum on ground of one to two C-5/C-17 aircraft in a 24-hour day, 247 
man-hours per month basis”.  Similar to the HFHC1 UTC, it provides the 
minimum number of maintenance personnel to support ground handling and 
servicing, tire changes, and aircraft tows in support of an established command 
element.  If a specialist UTC is included as augmentation, it will increase the 
working MOG by two.  This UTC also maintains the red-x downgrade authority, 
the all-systems red-x and in-process inspections qualifications.  This UTC has a 
total of 7 personnel; one Major aircraft maintenance officer, three 7-level 
aerospace maintenance craftsmen, three aerospace maintenance journeymen.   
• 7E1AN:  This UTC is required for aircrew stage management and “…is used to 
manage aircrew stage operations.  Can stand alone or augment mobile, fixed, or 
enroute command and control.”  It is capable of 24-hour operations.  In total, 
there are four individuals included in this UTC; two generalist pilots with one 
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being a Major and the other a Captain, one 7-level aviation resource management 
craftsman, and one 5-level aviation resource management journeyman.  
• HFC05/HFHC17:  These UTCs serve to augment the HFHC1 UTC (each of 
these is airframe specific to either the C-17 or the C-5 aircraft) with the capability 
for repair and reclamation capabilities for a MOG of one in a single shift 
operation.  Either UTC can also augment the HFHC2 UTC to increase the MOG 
to four in a two shift operation.  Each has the same personnel requirements and 
include one 7-level, B-shop integrated avionics system craftsman, one 5-level, B-
shop integrated avionics system journeyman, one 7-level, A-shop integrated 
avionics system craftsman, one 5-level, A-shop integrated avionics system 
journeyman, one 7-level aerospace propulsion craftsman, one 5-level aerospace 
propulsion journeyman, one 7-level aircraft hydraulic systems craftsman, one 5-
level aircraft hydraulic systems journeyman, one 7-level aircraft electrical and 
environmental craftsman, and one 5-level aircraft electrical and environmental 
journeyman.  This UTC requires 10 individuals. 
  
With the UTCs identified for use in the study, the conversion into the workbook 
cost analysis tool was the next step.  Due to the structure of the UTC, assumptions were 
required in order to model the actual grade of the personnel since the UTC only provides 
the technical skill set required.  This technical skill set (7-level, 5-level, etc.) was 
converted to a specific grade for the purpose of analyzing the costs further, with a more 
conservative approach taken.  For the purpose of this study, the researcher assumed that a 
7-level would be considered an E-6 and a 5-level would be considered an E-5.  This does 
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not mean that in actuality a 7-level associated with a certain UTC must be a Technical 
Sergeant, nor a 5-level a Staff Sergeant, but to take a more conservative approach to 
model the annual cost of personnel, this approach was deemed sufficient and necessary.  
 With the UTC information gathered, analyzed, and converted for use in the 
workbook, the same calculations as the consolidated analysis were used.  By simply 
taking the mean annual pay per grade and multiplying by the number of personnel within 
that grade, the calculation obtains the total annual manpower pay per distributed base.  
For the distributed base calculation, an additional calculation was required in order to 
obtain a true representation of how many bases are required to sustain the aircraft transits 
per day that an otherwise consolidated and much larger base could handle.  The next sub-
section further defines the formulation for throughput capability as used in this analysis, 
but for now, suffice it to say that the total number of personnel required at one distributed 
base is then multiplied by the number of bases required for sustained capability.  This 
calculation allows for the total number of personnel required throughout the distributed 
base network, and likewise the total annual manpower pay of those personnel. 
Throughput Capability Incorporation 
The war fighter is the end-user and customer of the airlift into the theater, and for 
that reason, the throughput capability at the distributed bases had to equal what already 
exists at a consolidated base.  This comparison then answered the main question of this 
research.  But in order to obtain those numbers, an analysis was required on the 
throughput capability, in this case aircraft transits per day, for an accurate representation 
of the network in its entirety.  The calculation for throughput capability found in   
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AFPAM 10-1403 was used as the cornerstone for the formulation in this process and is 
found below: 
 
   (2) 
where 
   ATC = Aircraft Throughput Capability (measured in short tons) 
   MOG = Aircraft Maximum on Ground 
   Avg. Payload = Average aircraft payload measured in short-tons 
   Ops Hours = Time, in hours, aerial port is open 
   Ground Time = Mean aircraft ground preparation time in hrs 
   QE = Queuing efficiency of operation 
  
Through discussions with the AMC/A9AA office, the decision was made that the 
above formula would be altered for the purpose of this study for a more general use in 
this research.  Average payload was removed to form a new derivation of this formula to 
generalize the number of aircraft transits per day without having to identify the specific 
type aircraft required and the amount of cargo moved.  This incorporates a new unit of 
measurement more conducive to this research, labeled number of aircraft transits per day 
(ATPD) rather than Formula (2) whereby the dependent variable is measured in short 
tons.  All other variables remained the same, and the workbook was modeled to account 
for these variables as they relate to both the consolidated and the distributed network.  
The new formula used for this analysis is defined on the following page: 
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where 
   ATPD = Number of Aircraft Transits per Day 
   MOG = Aircraft Maximum on Ground 
   Ops Hours = Time, in hours, aerial port is open 
   Ground Time = Aircraft ground prep time, in mean hrs  
   QE = Queuing efficiency of operation 
 
The TACC Planners Guide and AFPAM 10-1403 were used to enumerate the 
variables of the above formula.  The TACC Planners Guide was incorporated for the two 
variables in the numerator, MOG and Ops Hrs.  AFPAM 10-1403 was used to define the 
denominator and is located in Appendix A.  The 85% queuing efficiency was deemed 
appropriate.  Historically, planners and strategists have included this factor in certain 
formulas “…to account for the physical impossibility of using limited airfield facilities 
with perfect efficiency” (AFPAM 10-1403, 2003:26).  A simple example was provided 
by AFPAM 10-1403 and posited that an aircraft parking spot is never instantly occupied 
after it is vacated (2003:26).  The researcher chose 85% for use in this analysis due to its 
pre-existing acceptance.  Table 1 on the following page depicts the actual workbook 
formulation for analysis.  The numbers are explained in more depth to provide an 
example as to how the aircraft transits per day required for the distributed en route 
strategy were incorporated into the associated manpower costs.  The line titled MOG 
represents the defined MOG capability in existence at a particular airfield, as well as the 
MOG desired for the airfields included in the distributed support system.  For this 
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example, a MOG of four was used for the consolidated base whereby four was selected 
from the TACC Planners Guide as the working contingency MOG for C-17 aircraft at 
Ramstein AB, Germany.  For conservative planning, the researcher chose to model a 24-
hour aerial port operation though the TACC Planners Guide reported a 22-hour operation 
due to noise restrictions at night.  The ground time, as defined by AFPAM 10-1403 for 
refuel and go operations of C-17 aircraft was modeled at 2.25 hours.  Queuing efficiency 
was modeled at 85% due to the impracticality of a 100% efficient operation.  Using 
Formula (3), the mathematical calculation resulted in 36.267 aircraft transits per day for 
the consolidated support system. 
 
Table 1:  Throughput Capability Calculation Example 
 
 
 For the distributed support system, the AMC/A9AA office desired to model the 
most simple of airfield requirements with minimal manning.  A MOG of one was 
selected with a one-shift per day operation of 10 hours.  The ground time was kept at 2.25 
hours based off of the refuel only requirement for C-17 aircraft defined by AFPAM 10-
1403, and the queuing efficiency remained at 85% as before.  Using the same formula as 
the consolidated system, the calculation resulted in 3.778 aircraft transits per day.  An 
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additional calculation then remained to account for the approximate 9 fold difference in 
aircraft transits per day.  By dividing the number of aircraft transits per day of the 
consolidated system by the number of aircraft transits per day of the distributed system, 
the calculation resulted in a 10-base (due to decimal point rounding within the workbook 
calculation for a realistic number of airfields) requirement for the distributed network of 
support bases in order to equal the required throughput capability (or in this case, aircraft 
transits per day) of the larger consolidated base. 
Final Calculation 
 The result from the above example of 10 bases in the distributed network was 
then included in the final calculation to obtain the estimated manpower total mean cost 
per year of the distributed network.  This number was then multiplied by the total annual 
manpower pay for one distributed base and by the total number of personnel required.  
These final numbers were used to compare the manpower numbers and costs of the 
consolidated base versus the distributed bases of the en route support system. 
Assumptions and Limitations  
This section lists the assumptions and limitations of this research that were 
deemed necessary for the analysis’ completion.  None are so grave that a non-valid 
research analysis is warranted, but nonetheless assumptions and limitations must be 
mentioned for any future modifications or changes.  The following are the assumptions 
for this work: 
1) The UMD from Dover AFB resembles the UMD of any consolidated en route 
airbase. 
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a. The lieutenants authorized are split in half amongst the grades of O-1 and 
O-2 
2) The particular UTCs used for the distributed en route system analysis, specifically 
7E1AE, 7E1AN, HFHC2, are accurate and realistic depictions of manpower 
requirements to sustain refuel only operations at a distributed field. 
3) The rank of Technical Sergeant (grade of E-6) was used to model a 7-level 
technician as required by the UTCs mentioned in assumption 2. 
4) The rank of Staff Sergeant (grade of E-5) was used to model a 5-level technician 
as required by the UTCs mentioned in assumption 2. 
5) Max amount of time spent in military service was 22 years.  This allowed for ease 
in calculating the mean annual pay per grade. 
6) Prior-enlisted officers are not allocated within the Dover UMD, to allow for ease 
in calculating the mean annual pay per grades O-1 through O-3. 
7) A queuing efficiency of 85% sufficiently models the expected efficiency in the 
day-to-day operations of an aerial port. 
8) The model assumes an unlimited number of airfield locations in a certain 
geographic region that the Department of Defense is capable of selecting for the 
distributed network. 
9) The UTCs selected for use assume that all other required manpower resources for 
airfield operations is inherent to the airfields selected for inclusion in the 
distributed network. 
10)  One shift equals 10 hours of work.  
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11)  Aircrew personnel from an arriving aircraft are replaced by another crew with the 
required crew rest, and the aircraft then departs the airfield. 
 
The limitations of the research are just as important to discuss as the assumptions, 
mainly to provide a better understanding for those, who may in the future, choose to 
further this research.  As mentioned previously, the manpower costs are not complete and 
only include the base pay associated with a particular grade; military service members as 
well as civilians.  If the geographic area of the distributed network were known, a better 
cost estimate is possible given the basic allowance for housing could be included in the 
estimate.  The other allotted pay amounts would also be known and could be included.  
The UTCs used in the research provide only minimum personnel requirements to support 
a gas-and-go operation.  Therefore, another assumption and limitation posed by this 
research is that no aircraft within the network would ever require maintenance.  Lastly, 
the UTCs chosen for this research are strictly for gas-and-go operations and require 
further analysis if the desire exists to bolster capabilities at these particular en route 
bases.  These points are discussed in a later chapter as they relate to future research ideas. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
Introduction 
 The versatility of the workbook developed for use in the manpower cost analysis 
allows for multiple comparisons.  Chapter III presented the methodology and this chapter 
presents a few different comparisons of expected scenarios in developing en route 
strategies.  Furthermore, with the limitations of this research discussed in Chapter III, the 
UTCs previously selected for analysis remain the cornerstone of the analyses presented in 
this section.  The analyses include a comparison of a one shift operation and that of a two 
shift operation with a MOG of one requirement for the distributed network of en route 
support airfields.  The analysis also includes a MOG of four with a two shift operation to 
model a more bolstered en route distributed support system that incorporates maintenance 
and supply elements.  In all situations, a crew staging UTC (7E1AN) is used for the 
assumption that the aircraft always depart an en route airfield the same day of arrival as 
long as the aircraft is mission-capable.  The 7E1AN UTC allows for crew staging 
management and overall supervision and scheduling of crews during changeover due to 
crew rest requirements as defined by the military and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).  To conclude this section, a brief comparison is presented with 
regards to the total manpower costs associated with a particular manpower analysis 
related to this research compared to the cost analysis that would develop from using the 
average cost per officer and enlisted member used by AFI 65-503.  The personnel 
required for the MOG 4 – 2 Shift operation of a distributed network is used for the cost 
analysis developed from AFI 65-503. 
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MOG 1 – 1 Shift Operation 
 The primary research question posed by the AMC/A9AA office was what the 
total manpower cost of a single shift operation throughout a network of distributed bases 
would be in comparison to a consolidated en route support base.  For this reason, the 
formulation was setup based on a single shift operation (in this scenario one shift equaled 
10 operational hours) that supported a MOG of one.  Table 2 below is a snapshot from 
the workbook tool used in the formulation. 
 
Table 2:  MOG 1 - 1 Shift Aircraft Transits Per Day 
 
 
 The column labeled Consolidated represents the data that corresponds to 
Ramstein AB, Germany as defined by the TACC Planners Guide.  The working MOG 
associated with Ramstein AB included 4 C-17 and 2 C-5 aircraft for a total MOG equal to 
six as depicted in the row titled MOG.  The operational hours are again taken from the 
TACC Planners Guide and equal 22 due to the two hours of quiet hours from 2200-2400.  
The ground time of 2.25 hours is based on data from AFPAM 10-1403 for en route refuel 
only and the queuing efficiency of 85% is included in the formulation as a previously 
accepted standard used in modeling efficiency levels.  The number of aircraft transits per 
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day is calculated by using Formula (3) with the final number for Ramstein AB under the 
above stated parameters equal to 49.867 aircraft transits per day.   
 The column labeled Distributed reflects the parameters set by the AMC/A9AA 
office to identify the minimum personnel requirements for a distributed network of bases 
to replace a consolidated base as identified in the paragraph above.  In this case, a 
working MOG of one is used under a single shift operation of 10 hours per day.  The 
ground time remains the same at 2.25 hours as defined by AFPAM 10-1403 with the same 
queuing efficiency of 85%.  By using Formula (3), the number of aircraft transits per day 
equates to 3.778 aircraft transits per day for one base within the distributed network of en 
route bases.  In carrying out the final calculation to obtain the total number of distributed 
bases needed to equate the total aircraft transits per day provided by a consolidated base, 
the aircraft transits per day from the consolidated base is divided by the number of 
aircraft transits per day from the initial distributed network calculation.  For this scenario, 
dividing 49.867 (consolidated throughput) by 3.778 (distributed throughput for one base) 
the total number of distributed bases required for the en route support network is 13 
(realistic number after rounding).  With the throughput calculation completed and the 
total number of distributed bases required for the network known, the total manpower 
cost associated with the network can be determined.   
 For the manpower associated with this analysis, the following UTCs were used:  
7E1AF, 7E1AN, and HFHC1.  These UTCs represent the minimum manpower 
requirements needed to support refuel only operations for a single shift (10 operational 
hours) and a MOG of one.  Table 3 lists the grades of the individual requirements as set 
by the aforementioned UTCs. 
 
43 
 
Table 3:  MOG 1 - 1 Shift Distributed Manpower 
 
 
Table 3 depicts a total of 14 individuals required at a total annual cost for one 
base in the system of $553,050.  To obtain the total cost of the entire distributed network 
of en route bases, these numbers must be multiplied by the number of bases required in 
the system to equal the total aircraft transits per day of a consolidated base; in this case it 
would be Ramstein AB.  These calculations are 182 total individuals at a total mean 
annual cost of $7,189,646 for the entire distributed system.   
 To compare these numbers to the consolidated en route support system, Dover’s 
UMD was used with the calculations listed on the next page in Table 4.  Table 4 
calculates the total manpower cost of the consolidated en route airfield (Dover AFB 
UMD) to include the military service members and the civilians.  There are a total of 
3,223 military service members at a cost of $107.7 million.  The General Schedule (GS) 
personnel total 287 members at $11.5 million, the National Security Personnel System 
(NSPS) wage grades total 147 people with a cost of $9.6 million, and finally the hourly 
employees within the WG grades total 268 people at an annual cost of approximately 
$18.3 million.  The total number of personnel defined by the UMD is 3,925 personnel 
with a mean annual cost of $147.2 million. 
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Table 4:  Total Required Consolidated Manpower 
 
 
 
 The workbook incorporates another spreadsheet for a much simpler representation 
for the comparison and is depicted in Figure 7 on the following page.  It provides rapid 
visibility of the exact comparison of the two en route systems analyzed.  For the MOG 1 
– 1 Shift scenario, the distributed system uses 3,743 less personnel, and the personnel 
cost is approximately $140 million less than the consolidated en route system.  Figure 7 
also depicts the aircraft transits per day for each system to identify the capability easily 
without having to change tabs within the workbook. 
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Figure 7:  MOG 1 - 1 Shift Quick Comparison 
  
MOG 1 – 2 Shift Operation  
 The first set of results is for a very basic representation of a distributed network as 
prescribed by the AMC/A9AA office.  For this research, a second analysis was conducted 
to compare the calculations of a MOG 1 – 1 Shift operation to that of a MOG 1 – 2 Shift 
operation.  The same process was used as before, with the first calculation being the 
aircraft transits per day identifying the specific number of distributed bases required in 
the network.  These calculations are represented in Table 5 on the following page. 
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Table 5:  MOG 1 - 2 Shift Aircraft Transits Per Day 
 
 
 Table 5 used the same parameters as the MOG 1 – 1 Shift operation:  a MOG of 
6, aerial port operations of 22 hours defined by the TACC Planners Guide, 2.25 hours of 
ground time for refuel only purposes defined by AFPAM 10-1403, and the historical 
standard of 85% for the queuing efficiency.  The number of aircraft transits per day in the 
consolidated network remained at 49.867.  The distributed network parameters were 
changed slightly.  The MOG of one remained the same, as well as the 2.25 hours of 
ground time and the queuing efficiency of 85%.  The change was made to the operational 
hours incorporated into this analysis.  One shift equals 10 hours for the purpose of this 
research, and since these results are predicated on a two shift operation this number was 
increased to 20.  The throughput calculation of the distributed network resulted in 7.556 
aircraft transits per day per base.  For the entire network to support the total number of 
aircraft transits per day within the consolidated system, the distributed network must 
include at least seven bases.  After obtaining this number, the distributed network 
personnel requirements can now be examined. 
  The UTCs required for a two-shift operation and a MOG of one are 7E1AE, 
7E1AN, HFHC1, and HFHC2.  While similar to the first analysis for a single shift 
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operation, there were a few necessary changes.  The 7E1AF UTC was replaced with 
7E1AE, and HFHC2 was added to augment HFHC1 for a two shift operation.  The 
numbers are illustrated below in Table 6. 
 
Table 6:  MOG 1 - 2 Shift Distributed Manpower 
 
 
 The manpower requirements for a distributed network in a MOG 1 – 2 Shift 
operation totals 28 personnel at a total mean annual cost of $1,167,342 million for a 
single base.  By incorporating the first calculation that determined the number of bases 
required to equate to the 50 aircraft transits per day of a consolidated base, the grand total 
comes to 196 personnel at a mean annual cost of $8,171,395 million.   
 The consolidated requirements are exactly the same as the first analysis in this 
chapter; therefore, refer to Table 4.  For a quick depiction of the comparison of this study 
refer to Figure 8 on the following page.  It provides a quick visualization of the actual 
comparison of a consolidated network to that of a distributed network.  The consolidated 
numbers have not changed from the previous analysis, but by changing the shift operation 
from one to two (20 operational hours), personnel numbers have increased but are still 
3,729 fewer personnel requirements than the consolidated.  The total mean annual cost 
 
48 
 
has also increased from the first analysis, but it still is less than the consolidated cost by 
approximately $139 million while maintaining the required 50 aircraft transits per day. 
 
Figure 8:  MOG 1 - 2 Shift Quick Comparison 
 
MOG 4 – 2 Shift Operation 
 The purpose of the analysis of a MOG 4 – 2 Shift operation is to provide a 
decision-maker with additional information on what a distributed network of bases could 
provide for above and beyond the very minimal manning, but still far less than that of the 
consolidated network of bases.  The MOG 1 -2 Shift operation serves as the baseline 
comparison for the MOG 4 – 2 Shift analysis.  The HFC17 UTC enhances a two shift 
operation’s MOG capability to four with a minimum of additional personnel.  The 
HFHC2 UTC states that by augmenting with the HFC17 UTC (total of 10 individuals), an 
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operation has the enhanced capability for maintenance troubleshooting and repair of 
certain discrepancies and malfunctions.  This package does require additional supply 
support, in particular a spare parts kit and additional supply personnel.  Specifically, 
HFC17 UTC requires a supply personnel UTC (JFxxx) to augment this enhanced 
capability.  Therefore, the researcher chose to include the JFBAC UTC that provides a 
supply function and capability to establish connectivity to the Air Force’s supply system.  
This is not a standalone UTC and for this reason the JFBMR UTC was added for the 
capability to receive, source, and issue parts as necessary.  In total, these last two supply-
function UTCs include four additional individuals for one base; two 7-levels and two 5-
levels.   
 Table 7 on the following page depicts the throughput calculations required to 
obtain the number of aircraft transits per day and the final number of bases required in the 
distributed network.  As with the calculations included in the previous analyses, the 
consolidated system numbers remain the same with a MOG of 6, 22 hours of operational 
time, 2.25 hours of ground time, and a queuing efficiency of 85%.  Again, the calculation 
equates to 49.867 aircraft transits per day.   
 The distributed network can now be tabulated and used for comparison to the 
consolidated system, as well as the previously analyzed distributed network with a MOG 
of one.  The calculation for the distributed system changed to a MOG of four due to the 
enhanced UTC packages, with a two shift operation that is equal to 20 hours of 
operational time.  The ground time and queuing efficiency were the same as before, with 
the calculation obtaining 30.222 aircraft transits per day that amounts to two bases in the 
distributed network. 
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Table 7:  MOG 4 - 2 Shift Aircraft Transits Per Day 
 
 
 For the manpower calculations for the distributed network for a MOG of four and 
a two-shift operation, the UTCs described at the beginning of this analysis were used.  
Table 8 below depicts the personnel requirements associated with each of the 
aforementioned UTCs.  For one base in the distributed network, the total personnel 
required for full operation with the 7E1AE, 7E1AN, HFHC1, HCHC2, HFHC17, 
JFBAC, and JFBMR UTCs is 42 people at a total mean annual cost of approximately 
$1.648 million.  To equal the throughput capability of the consolidated base of 50 aircraft 
transits per day, the distributed network requires two bases with each containing 42 
people.  This comes to a grand total for the distributed network of 84 people at a total 
mean annual cost of approximately $3.296 million. 
 
Table 8:  MOG 4 - 2 Shift Distributed Manpower 
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 The consolidated requirements are exactly the same as the first analysis in this 
chapter; therefore, refer to Table 4.  For a quick depiction of the comparison of this study 
refer to Figure 9 below.  The data from Figure 9 indicate that in a MOG 4 – 2 Shift 
operation, the manpower requirements decrease from the previous analyses to 84 
personnel; 3,841 people less than the consolidated base at a total mean annual cost of 
approximately $144 million less than the consolidated base.  This scenario would be 
slightly different from the other two in that the infrastructure requirements would be 
greater due to the enhanced maintenance and supply capability, and should be taken into 
consideration for this reason.   
 
Figure 9:  MOG 4 - 2 Shift Quick Comparison 
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Average Cost Analysis Compared to Workbook Analysis 
 Typically the Air Force models cost comparisons by using a very generic formula 
that incorporates the average pay of an officer and enlisted member on an annual basis.  
As defined by AFI 65-503, US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors, the average basic 
pay per officer per year amounts to $64,386 and for an enlisted service member, $31,398.  
For the purpose of a cost comparison, the annual pay per grade is used in this research. 
Table 8 demonstrates the use of the total mean annual pay per grade associated with the 
distributed network used for a MOG 4 – 2 Shift operation.  It includes a total of 84 
individuals required, broken down into 42 per base.  Of these 42, 6 are officers and 36 are 
enlisted.  Inherent to the formulation used, these personnel numbers are multiplied by the 
number of bases necessary to support the required aircraft transits per day.  The annual 
mean total for the distributed network is equal to $3,296,169 for the 84 personnel.  Table 
9 depicts the numbers used for the same calculation but through the use of the average 
cost per officer and enlisted as identified by Appendix B generated from AFI 65-503.  To 
calculate officer cost, six officers are multiplied by the average basic pay of $64,386 for a 
total of $386,316.  To calculate enlisted costs, 36 are multiplied by the average basic pay 
of $31,398 for a total of $1,130,328.  The total average annual basic pay for the 
distributed system with two bases is $3,033,288.  Compared to the formulation used by 
the researcher, this number is $262,881 less than the more precise method used for the 
analyses within this research.   
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Table 9:  Average Member Pay (AFI 65-503) 
 
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this workbook was not only to make this analysis possible, but to 
provide AMC with a tool to use in other studies.  The pay sheets in the workbook are 
designed for quick and easy updates as pay table’s change from year to year.  Therefore, 
the workbook was developed to allow for easy updates of costs as new pay tables are 
enacted.  In order to better depict the final calculations within this research, Table 10 
provides a visual comparison of the three analyses and is presented in the next chapter.   
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 The focus of any research analysis is to provide answers to a topic that is 
otherwise unknown.  The Air Force has utilized virtually the same en route support 
structure since its inception after World War II.  With a changing environment and more 
constrained resources, innovative ideas are required to effectively sustain the war fighter 
on the front line in contingencies as well as providing support to the many humanitarian 
efforts needed worldwide.  This chapter focuses on the conclusions and the 
recommendations of this research, as well as provides insight into possible future 
research ideas. 
Conclusions 
 Chapter IV presented three different distributed network scenarios to compare 
manpower costs and physical infrastructure requirements (number of airfields) to the 
consolidated system prevalent in today’s structure.  Table 10 below provides a depiction 
of all the scenarios analyzed and the following subsections detail the advantages and 
disadvantages of the three scenarios. 
 
Table 10:  Analysis Comparison 
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 MOG 1 – 1 Shift Operation Conclusion 
 The total personnel required to maintain the necessary throughput in this scenario 
is 182 individuals at a cost of $7,189,646.  The personnel in this system would be split 
amongst 13 bases to operate on a single, 10 hour shift to support a MOG equal to one.  
While not the cheapest, this option would provide for a relatively small footprint with 
only 14 people at a particular base working for only 10 hours a day.  This scenario would 
allow for a very limited presence at any one base, should that be requested by the host 
nation.  Sustainment would be required for living purposes only, as the package would be 
predicated on a refuel only mission. 
 This particular scenario requires an extensive number of airfields to operate (more 
so than the other scenarios, at least) and therefore could pose potential problems with a 
host nation(s).  On the margin, this scenario may actually cost more than the second 
scenario with the inclusion of opportunity costs, since the total number of bases is close 
to twice as many as the same MOG with a two-shift operation. 
 MOG 1 – 2 Shift Operation Conclusion 
 This particular scenario closely resembles the MOG 1 – 1 Shift operation, with an 
additional 14 people to total 196 people at a total cost of approximately $1 million more.  
Advantageously, the number of bases required to sustain the necessary throughput 
capability is decreased to seven bases.  The operation would be a 20-hour workday, 
capable of more flexibility with aircraft arrivals.  The presence of personnel at the seven 
bases would provide more capability and potential for manpower use if a particular 
aircraft requires additional resources.  With the need for less physical infrastructure in 
this particular distributed network, the political approval of gaining access to a smaller 
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number of airfields is easier to obtain.  This is a particular advantage over the first 
scenario, as long as the host nation(s) is supportive of a two-shift operation with twice as 
many service members housed at a particular location. 
 A disadvantage of this system is the cost and the increased number of personnel in 
the event that the goal is to support en route refuel destinations with the minimum 
number of personnel at the lowest cost.  The operation of two shifts also dictates a greater 
need for management at some level to schedule personnel, and the local airfield 
infrastructure must be capable of supporting this type of operation.  From a more critical 
perspective, to reap the benefits of this scenario the necessary aspects of airfield 
operations, like weather and control tower operation, must operate during the necessary 
hours to support a two shift operation.  
 MOG 4 – 2 Shift Operation Conclusion 
 Discussed in previous chapters was the necessity of an analysis of a more 
enhanced distributed en route support system that provides a maintenance and supply 
element.  This scenario actually provides the cheapest manpower cost with the least 
amount of airfields required for the necessary throughput.  The package calls for 42 
people per base to operate on a 20 hour basis.  The total mean annual cost for manpower 
is under $4 million.  The main advantage of this scenario is that it provides a bolstered 
presence to handle some of the many maintenance discrepancies that are possible, 
potentially saving money in transportation costs of support personnel in an otherwise 
scaled-down personnel requirement like that of the first two scenarios.  This scenario also 
happens to be the cheapest option for total manpower cost, though it does increase the 
presence at a particular location. 
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 With the presence of 42 personnel at a particular location that work for 20 hours 
per day, this would require a local infrastructure capable of supporting this large number 
of people with ground equipment and special parking considerations for maintenance 
work.  This scenario would be limited to locations that are already large in terms of 
infrastructure and capability which may pose problems in obtaining the necessary 
agreements with a foreign state. 
Recommendations 
Given the three scenarios in this analysis, each has advantages and disadvantages 
that must be considered before a final decision is made.  All three could pay huge 
dividends to the en route support system.  If a distributed network is selected, the 
potential manpower savings are tremendous.  The cheapest option is the enhanced MOG 
4 – 2 Shift operation that includes a bolstered maintenance capability with the associated 
supply element.  With only two bases required and 84 total personnel with a mean annual 
cost of only $3,296,169, the opportunity to take advantage of this scenario is apparent.  If 
the decision maker wishes to provide only a refuel capability within the network, then the 
cheapest option would be a single shift operation with a MOG of one.  More bases would 
be required, but the personnel associated would be less than that of a two shift operation 
and roughly $1 million cheaper.  Given the office of sponsorship for this research the 
MOG 1 – 1 Shift operation would be the recommended network for a distributed system.  
The AMC/A9AA office was interested in a refuel only mission with a one shift operation.  
The MOG 1 – 1 Shift operation fulfills that interest, and the analysis conducted provided 
the comparison to that of the consolidated system.  Although this distributed system 
includes the most bases, it provides the least amount of manning required per base at a 
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reasonable annual cost.  It simply is predicated upon a refuel only mission within a one 
shift per day time frame that makes for minimal infrastructure requirements aside from 
the number of bases in the system.  
Future Research 
There has been prior research in the realm of en route systems, specifically the 
research conducted by Sere and Voigt who have been mentioned throughout this analysis.  
This research sets a foundation for the costs associated with a distributed network of 
bases rather than the traditional consolidated system, but only analyzes the manpower 
costs.  Future research opportunities exist in the other costs that would be associated with 
a distributed network, such as contract costs with host nations.  A large assumption in this 
sort of network of facilities is that aircraft land and takeoff on schedule with no 
maintenance discrepancies.  A computer simulation could be accomplished to take break 
rates into account, as well as unscheduled maintenance events for transport aircraft.  This 
simulation could incorporate a 13-base network of distributed bases like that of the MOG 
1 – 1 Shift operation scenario presented in this analysis, and in addition, should examine 
the likelihood of maintenance discrepancies and the frequency at which these would 
occur.  An analysis of this area could prove beneficial in the selection of what type of 
distributed network should be selected, such as the MOG 4 – 2 Shift operation presented 
in this research. 
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Appendix A:  Ground Times 
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Appendix B: Military Pay Rates per Unit of Time 
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Appendix C:  Dover AFB, DE Unit Manning Document (as of Dec 2009) 
  
GRADE 10/4 
 OFF ENL CIV TOTAL 
 COL 6 6 
 LTCOL 40 40 
 MAJOR 51 51 
 CAPT 109 109 
 LT 86 86 
 CMSGT 22 22 
 SMSGT 39 39 
 MSGT 252 252 
 TSGT 461 461 
 SSGT 754 754 
 SRA 682 682 
 A1C 721 721 
 YC-03 1 1 
 YC-02 31 31 
 YC-01 7 7 
 YA-02 48 48 
 YB-02 5 5 
 YB-01 2 2 
 YF-03 1 1 
 YF-02 8 8 
 YD-02 10 10 
 YD-01 1 1 
 YH-02 7 7 
 YN-01 9 9 
 YM-01 17 17 
 GS-12 3 3 
 GS-11 34 34 
 GS-10 4 4 
 GS-09 69 69 
 GS-08 12 12 
 GS-07 40 40 
 GS-06 14 14 
 GS-05 47 47 
 GS-04 59 59 
 GS-03 5 5 
 WS-15 1 1 
 WS-14 1 1 
 WS-12 1 1 
 WS-11 5 5 
 WS-10 5 5 
 WS-09 9 9 
 WS-08 10 10 
 WS-07 1 1 
 WS-06 3 3 
 WS-05 1 1 
 WS-04 4 4 
 WS-03 1 1 
 WL-10 12 12 
 WL-08 6 6 
 WG-12 14 14 
 WG-11 10 10 
 WG-10 87 87 
 WG-09 9 9 
 WG-08 27 27 
 WG-07 12 12 
 WG-06 15 15 
 WG-05 7 7 
 WG-03 2 2 
 TBD 27 27 
 Report Total 292 2931 704 3927 
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Appendix D:  2010 Military Pay Scale 
 
 
  
 
63 
 
Appendix D:  2010 Military Pay Scale (Continued) 
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Appendix E:  General Schedule Pay Scale 
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Appendix F:  Wx Pay Scale 
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Appendix G.  Blue Dart 
 
Manpower Cost Analysis of a Consolidated and a Distributed En Route Support System 
“Simply put, we have three wartime mission objectives:  Get the war fighter to the fight, 
Sustain the war fighter during the fight, Bring the war fighter home after the fight.” 
-  
- John Handy, General, USTRANSCOM/CC, 2004 
 
In a broad sense, the above objectives remain unchanged since the inception of 
the Air Force.  But what has changed is the environment with which we transport and 
sustain our war fighters, and to that end our strategy must also change.  For a vast amount 
of time in the Air Force’s history, we were postured to fight the Cold War.  And we built 
up a global presence because of it that included as many as 45 en route support airfields 
with vast amounts of infrastructure and manpower to coincide.  But when the Cold War 
ended and a new threat began to arise, our strategy needed a serious reconstruction. 
The last true war fought against another state was Desert Storm in the early 1990s 
when Saddam Hussein’s name became common around the dinner table.  Since, the 
major conflicts we have fought in have been against a “stateless” organization with a 
highly generalized description as “The War on Terror”.  With that, a leaner and agile 
warfighting requirement has developed where manpower cuts have been common place 
and infrastructure draw-downs throughout the world have occurred.  Those 45 en route 
bases we once occupied have since been reduced to only 13.  The core tenet of flexibility 
has become threatened. 
While numerous studies have been accomplished on the en route system, most 
have focused on the same strategy of optimal location and base selection similar to what 
we as an organization have always done.  This research focused on the new concept of a 
distributed network of en route support bases, where a certain required number of smaller 
bases are used instead of one of the 13 larger bases we currently have.  The analysis was 
completed with the requirement that the aircraft transits per day from a base such as 
Ramstein AB, Germany was equal to the total number of aircraft transits per day from the 
smaller, distributed bases.  Could the Air Force posture an en route support system with 
minimal manning at already existing airfields with inherent infrastructure and personnel? 
This research identified a new possibility in en route structures by identifying the Unit 
Type Codes necessary to support a refuel only mission at an en route location that allows 
for minimal manning and a smaller, more flexible infrastructure.   
Though further research is required, this analysis potentially identified huge 
savings in manpower costs.  Specifically, the manpower used in a distributed network  
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Appendix G. Blue Dart (Continued) 
 
could utilize approximately 3,600 fewer people with savings of well over $130 million 
per year.  The advantage this distributed network has is that the locations of these bases 
utilize previously existing personnel and infrastructure from a particular host nation.  
This allows for a much smaller contingent of personnel that support only the function of 
the en route strategy selected.  This research chose to focus on a refuel only strategy, as 
well as a very basic maintenance package to coincide with the refuel mission.  The 
primary concern is that the necessary aircraft transits required to support the war fighter 
is equal to that of the consolidated base.  The formulation used in this analysis calculates 
the necessary aircraft transits and builds a network of bases to support it.   
This research provides another way to envision a global network of en route 
support bases; a potential to save millions of dollars in a time of budgetary constraints. 
We must continue to have the capability to fly, fight, and win, but also we must continue 
to find efficient, yet effective means in which to sustain our valuable men and women on 
the front lines. 
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Appendix H.  Quad Chart 
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